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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2158 
 ___________ 
 
 SOPHIA POOLE, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
OFFICER FRANK MARKS; ROBERT C. WYDA; PTLM SEAN MCGRAIL;  
PTLM MICHAEL DUNN; PTLM TOM REIGATTI; PTLM ROSE SCABILLONI;  
PETER SCABILLONI; POLICE CHIEF JOHN MACKEY 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2- 10-cv-00722) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 28, 2011 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: August 8, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Sophia Poole appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of her claims.  For the 
following reasons, we will summarily affirm. 
2 
 
I. 
 On May 25, 2010, Poole filed a one-page, handwritten, pro se amended complaint 
against the following defendants: (1) her neighbors, Rose and Peter Scabilloni; (2) 
Officer Frank Marks; Patrolmen Michael Dunn, Sean McGrail, and Tom Reigatti; and 
Police Chief John Mackey; all of the Bethel Park Police Department (collectively “police 
officer defendants”);1 and (3) Robert Wyda, a Magistrate Judge in Allegheny County.  
The amended complaint suggested that Poole’s claims arose from an altercation with 
Peter Scabilloni that led to her false arrest and the initiation of false charges against her.     
 The three sets of defendants filed separate responses to the amended complaint.  
First, Wyda moved to dismiss, arguing that he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity 
from Poole’s claims and, alternatively, that Poole failed to state a claim against him.  
Next, the police officer defendants moved for a more definite statement.  Finally, the 
Scabillonis moved to dismiss, predominantly arguing that the District Court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against them.  The Magistrate Judge assigned 
to the case granted the police officer defendants’ motion for a more definite statement 
and issued a report and recommendation advising the District Court to grant Wyda’s 
motion to dismiss without prejudice to Poole filing an amended complaint, since the basis 
for her allegations against Wyda were unclear. 
 Poole filed objections to the report and recommendation and an “amendment for a 
more definite statement of facts” –  essentially a second amended complaint.  The 
                                                 
1
 Poole appears to have brought her claim against Mackey in his official capacity 
in an effort to sue the Municipality of Bethel Park.  
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pleading appears to assert civil rights claims against the police officer defendants and 
Wyda pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law tort claims against the Scabillonis, all 
of which are based on a May 25, 2007 altercation between the neighbors and the police 
officer defendants’ response to that incident.  On that date, Peter Scabilloni allegedly 
threatened Poole and her son, attempted to assault Poole with an iron rod, and, in the 
process, caused damage to her garage.
2
  Certain of the police officer defendants came to 
Poole’s house in response to the incident and “took the Scabillonis[’] side” in the matter.  
(Document 31 at 3.)  Poole contends that Officer Marks beat up her son in the course of 
arresting him and assaulted her by punching her in the arm; that Patrolman McGrail 
“threw away [her] house and car keys;” and that when she told Patrolman Reigatti that 
Scabilloni had assaulted her, Reigatti “yelled to Mr. Scabilloni to not worry about it 
because she can’t do anything to you.”  (Id.)  
 On June 4, 2007, when Poole attempted to file charges against the police officer 
defendants, Wyda allegedly told Poole to “get [herself] and [sic] attorney and go to 
Pittsburgh.”  (Id.)  That same day, at a hearing before Wyda regarding the charges against 
her son, Poole learned that she would be charged in connection with the May 25, 2007 
incident.
3
  Wyda allegedly yelled at Poole during the course of proceedings, threatened to 
incarcerate her if she ever called the police again, and prevented her and her son from 
proving their innocence.  At another hearing in July of 2007, Wyda allegedly turned to 
                                                 
2
 Poole’s filings reflect a long-standing feud with the Scabillonis, stemming in part 
from what appears to be a dispute over whether Poole’s garage encroaches on the 
Scabillonis’ property. 
3
 The nature of the charges against Poole and her son are unclear, although a later 
filing suggests that the son was charged with assaulting a police officer. 
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Officer Marks and said “I don’t know why I let you get me mixed up in this.”  (Id.)    
 In response to the second amended complaint, the police officer defendants moved 
to dismiss the claims against them as barred by the statute of limitations.  In separate 
reports and recommendations, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing the claims 
against the Scabillonis for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to Poole reasserting those 
claims in state court, and recommended dismissing the claims against the police officer 
defendants as time barred.  Poole filed objections to both reports and recommendations.
4
 
The District Court granted Wyda’s motion to dismiss, concluding that, in light of 
Poole’s second amended complaint and her objections, she failed to state a claim and that 
Wyda was nevertheless entitled to absolute judicial immunity.  The District Court sua 
sponte raised the statute of limitations as an additional basis for dismissal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e), since Poole was proceeding in forma pauperis before the District 
Court.
5
  Next, the District Court dismissed the Scabilloni’s claims for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, finding an insufficient factual nexus between those claims and 
Poole’s federal claims to warrant supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).  
Finally, the District Court dismissed the police officer defendants’ claims as time-barred.  
                                                 
4
 Some of Poole’s filings allege additional details omitted from her complaint – 
e.g., that Officer McGrail strip searched her son after taking him into custody and 
that the Scabillonis lied to the police and made derogatory remarks toward her – 
but the majority of her submissions duplicate the subject matter contained in the 
second amended complaint. 
5
 A district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint pursuant to § 1915(e) based 
on an affirmative defense such as the statute of limitations “when the defense is 
obvious from the face of the complaint and no further factual record is required to 
be developed.”  See Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006)  
(quotations omitted). 
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Poole timely appealed. 
II. 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise de novo 
review over the District Court’s grant of Wyda and the police officer defendants’ motions 
to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  See Phillips v. Cnty. of 
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).  To survive dismissal, “a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotations 
omitted).  We also exercise de novo review over the District Court’s dismissal of Poole’s 
claims against the Scabillonis for lack of jurisdiction.  See Landsman & Funk P.C. v. 
Skinder-Strauss Assocs., 640 F.3d 72, 75 (3d Cir. 2011).  We may summarily affirm if no 
substantial question is presented by the appeal.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 
10.6. 
A. Claims Against Police Officer Defendants and Wyda 
We agree with the District Court that Poole’s § 1983 claims against the police 
officer defendants and Wyda are time-barred.  Claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which in 
this case is two years.  See Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 
582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998); see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524.  Since Poole’s claims 
are all premised on events that happened between May and July of 2007, they are time-
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barred because she did not file her complaint until May 25, 2010.
6
   
In response to the police officer defendants’ motion to dismiss, Poole essentially 
acknowledged that her claims are late, but argued that equitable tolling should save them 
from dismissal.  We also look to state tolling principles in the § 1983 context in 
determining whether a claim is time-barred.  Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir. 
2000).  In Pennsylvania, judicial extensions of the statute of limitations are expressly 
forbidden absent fraud or its equivalent.
7
  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5504(a); see also 
Aivazoglou v. Drever Furnaces, 613 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).  Under the 
more lenient federal standard, which applies when use of the state court’s rules would be 
contrary to federal law, “[e]quitable tolling is appropriate in three general scenarios: (1) 
where a defendant actively misleads a plaintiff with respect to her cause of action; (2) 
where the plaintiff has been prevented from asserting her claim as a result of other 
extraordinary circumstances; or (3) where the plaintiff asserts her claims in a timely 
manner but has done so in the wrong forum.”  Lake, 232 F.3d at 370 n.9. 
Poole has not established that tolling was justified under either standard.  
                                                 
6
 In connection with a “notice of facts” that Poole filed in response to the motions 
to dismiss, Poole provided a “Partial Lists [sic] of Dates and Time [sic] of 
Incidents Involving Peter Scabilloni Sr. and Family,” which references an October 
14, 2009 incident involving an “unknown” Bethel Park police officer.  (Document 
38 at 6.)  That allegation was never included in any version of her complaint, 
which was explicitly premised on the May 25, 2007 altercation and related events 
and, in any event, does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983.  Regardless, the 
allegation cannot preclude dismissal of the claims against the police officer 
defendants since it does not even pertain to them.   
7
 The one exception is the discovery rule, see Dalrymple v. Brown, 701 A.2d 164, 
167 (Pa. 1997), which is inapplicable here because Poole was indisputably aware 
of her injuries at the time they occurred.   
7 
 
Although she contends that Wyda precluded her from filing charges against the police 
officer defendants when she sought to do so on June 4, 2007, we do not see how that 
would have prevented her from timely filing her claims in federal court, especially since 
she had almost two years to do so.  Poole also indicates that she was waiting to file suit 
until she heard back from the American Civil Liberties Union as to whether it would 
represent her in this case.  That circumstance also does not provide a basis for tolling.
8
  
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the claims 
against the police officer defendants and Wyda as time-barred.
9
   
B. Claims Against Scabillonis 
We will also summarily affirm the District Court’s dismissal without prejudice of 
Poole’s state law claims against the Scabillonis for lack of jurisdiction.  In that regard, we 
need not determine whether the District Court correctly concluded that an insufficient 
nexus existed between Poole’s claims against the Scabillonis and her federal claims to 
justify supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
10
  See Pryzbowski v. U.S. 
                                                 
8
 Even after receiving a response from the ACLU declining representation, Poole 
waited 10 months to file her complaint.  That lack of diligence further supports our 
conclusion that tolling is inapplicable.  See New Castle Cnty. v. Halliburton NUS 
Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1126 (3d Cir. 1997) (“To invoke equitable tolling, [a 
plaintiff] must show that it exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and 
bringing its claims.”). 
9
 Given our conclusion, there is no need to consider the District Court’s alternative 
holdings that Poole failed to state a claim against Wyda and that Wyda is entitled 
to judicial immunity. 
10
 Since Poole’s claims against the Scabillonis are for violations of state law, the 
District Court did not have federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
And since the Scabillonis and Poole are all citizens of Pennsylvania, where they 
reside, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  
Accordingly, the key inquiry before the District Court was whether supplemental 
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Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 275 (3d Cir. 2001) (“We have interpreted [§ 1367(a)] to 
require the following: (1) [t]he federal claims must have substance sufficient to confer 
subject matter jurisdiction; (2) [t]he state and federal claims must derive from a common 
nucleus of operative fact; and (3) the plaintiff’s claims [must be] such that [s/]he would 
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.”) (quotations omitted 
and alterations in original).  Given our conclusion that the District Court properly 
dismissed the all of the federal claims that provided the basis for the District Court’s 
jurisdiction, it is apparent that supplemental jurisdiction over the Scabillonis claims 
would not be warranted at this stage of the litigation.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); 
Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[W]here the claim over which the 
district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must 
decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial economy, 
convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing 
so.”) (quotations omitted). 
In sum, we conclude that Poole’s appeal does not present a substantial question.11  
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm.  
                                                                                                                                                             
jurisdiction existed by virtue of the District Court’s jurisdiction over Poole’s § 
1983 claims against the remaining defendants.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1343; 
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 
11
 We also agree with the District Court that Poole’s son was not made a proper 
plaintiff in this litigation.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; see also Osei-Afriyie ex rel. 
Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[A] non-
attorney parent must be represented by counsel in bringing an action on behalf of 
his or her child.”); C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (a non-attorney plaintiff “has no authority to appear as an attorney for 
others than himself”).                 
 
